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Executive Summary
The Determinants of Credit Ratings in the United Kingdom
Insurance Industry
Academic researchers have devoted a considerable amount of attention to the activities of
credit rating agencies over the past 20 years, focusing in particular on the agencies’ potential role
in overseeing corporate financial strength and promoting the efficient operation of financial
markets. Examinations of credit rating practices has recently extended to the insurance industry,
where the complex technical nature of market transactions leads to policyholders, investors and
others facing particularly acute information asymmetries at the point-of-sale. Published credit
ratings are therefore seen as helping to alleviate imperfections in insurance markets by providing a
third party opinion on the adequacy of an insurer’s financial health and the likelihood of it meeting
obligations to policyholders and others in the future. Although the United Kingdom (UK)
insurance market is now one of the five largest in the world, relatively little is known about the
practices of the major firms and policy-makers which influence its operations. In particular, whilst
the determinants of rating agencies’ assessments of United States (US) insurers is well
documented, published studies have yet to provide comprehensive evidence about insurance
company ratings in the UK. This study attempts to fill this gap by examining the ratings awarded
by two of the world’s leading agencies – A.M. Best and Standard and Poor (S&P) – and
establishing the extent to which organizational variables can help predict: (i) insurance firms’
decision to be rated; and (ii) the assigned ratings themselves.
Our sample of UK data comprises ratings made by A.M. Best and S&P over the period
1993-1997 for both life and property-liability insurers. The panel data we use is ordinal in nature
and is therefore analysed using an ordered probit model. However, because neither A.M. Best or
S&P rate the full population of UK insurance firms our data set is potentially subject to self-
selection bias and we therefore extend the model to correct for such problems. In particular, the
paper examines the effect of eight firm-specific variables (namely, capital adequacy, profitability,
liquidity, growth, size, mutual/stockowner status, reinsurance level, and short/long-term nature of
business) on the ratings awarded by the two agencies, as well as on insurance firms’ decisions to
volunteer for the ratings in the first place.
In general terms, our evidence concurs with earlier US findings, and suggests that
although the decision to be rated by either of the agencies is largely influenced by a common set
of factors, the determinants of the ratings themselves appear to differ. Specifically, our first main
finding is that insurers’ decisions to be rated by either A.M. Best or S&P is positively related to
surplus growth, profitability and leverage. Second, while we find that A.M. Best’s ratings are
positively linked to profitability and liquidity, as well as being generally higher for mutual insurers,
the findings for S&P differ substantially. Although liquidity again exerted a positive influence on
assigned ratings, the only other statistically significant variable was financial leverage, which had a
negative sign.
We believe that the results of our research are of potential importance for companies
operating in insurance markets as well as for policy-makers, brokers and others. For example, the
evidence that mutual insurers are generally assigned higher ratings than stock insurers suggests
that certain publicly-traded insurers, in particular new entrants, might not possess sound financial
strength and may require closer regulatory scrutiny than other, more established, insurance firms.
In addition, the finding that liquidity has a significantly positive effect on ratings assigned by two
of the world’s leading credit agencies should provide a measure of confidence about the
robustness of the ratings to industry regulators, policyholders and investors in the UK. This could
imply that external ratings might eventually play a role in substituting for costly industry
regulation. The study concludes that although the factors influencing the decision to be rated by
A.M. Best or S&P are broadly the same, a degree of variability exists in the variables which
influence the actual ratings themselves. Insurance company managers should be aware of this
when contemplating whether to seek an independent rating and which agency to choose for the
assessment. We therefore believe that this study fills an important gap in the literature about key
players in the important UK insurance market and provides a basis for the conduct of future
research.
Mike Adams, Bruce Burton, Philip Hardwick
The Determinants of Credit Ratings in the United Kingdom
Insurance Industry
Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of external credit ratings attained by insurance firms in the
United Kingdom (UK) and of the decisions by those insurers to seek such an assessment in the
first place. Using panel data relating to A.M. Best-rated and Standard and Poor (S&P)-rated
insurers over the period 1993-1997, an ordered probit model with sample selection is employed to
test whether firm-specific variables influence both the decision by insurers to be rated and the
determinants of the ratings themselves. We find evidence to suggest that the decision to be rated
by either A.M. Best or S&P is positively related to profitability, leverage and growth, but
negatively related to company size and the extent of reinsurance. In contrast to the similarity in
findings about the decision to be rated, the paper highlights a number of apparent differences in
the determinants of the ratings awarded by the two agencies. Our results are shown to be of
potential interest to both participants in the insurance industry and policy-makers alike.
The Determinants of Credit Ratings in the United Kingdom
Insurance Industry
The role of credit rating agencies in overseeing corporate financial strength and promoting
the operation of financial markets has been a topic of intense interest in the finance literature for
more than twenty years (e.g., Weinstein, 1977; Pinches and Singleton, 1978; Holthausen and
Leftwich, 1986; Cantor and Packer, 1995, 1997). Investigation into credit rating practices has
also extended to insurance markets - markets in which the complex technical nature of insurance
transactions leads to policyholders, investors and others facing particularly acute information
asymmetries at the point-of-sale (Datta and Doherty, 1990). Published credit ratings therefore
help to alleviate imperfections in insurance markets by providing interested parties with “ . . . an
opinion on an insurer’s financial strength, including its operational performance and its ability to
meet its obligations to policyholders.” (Bouzouita and Young, 1998, p. 23).
As Cantor and Packer (1995) point out, credit rating agencies deal closely with issuers of
corporate securities and use both quantitative and qualitative information when formulating their
rating of a company’s financial condition. The information used to establish such rankings is
normally obtained from a combination of both public sources (e.g., the annual report and
accounts) and private information (e.g., managerial statements). However, factors such as
increased competition amongst credit rating agencies, the failure of those rating agencies to
predict insolvency accurately, and pressure from issuers of securities have caused many
commentators to question the credibility of financial ratings.1 This increased level of public
concern about the activities of leading rating agencies is consistent with the results of a recent
study by Ambrose and Carroll (1994) who report that external credit ratings are no better
predictors of insurance company failure than conventional financial ratio analysis. This suggests
that credit rating agencies may not possess unique and unbiased insights into the managerial
systems and strategies employed by insurance companies. Consequently, we use United Kingdom
                                         
1In the early 1990s several US insurers, including Mutual Benefit and Universal Life, became insolvent. The credit
rating agencies failed to predict these events (Carson and Scott, 1997).
(UK)-based insurance company data relating to two of the most prominent credit rating firms -
A.M. Best and Standard and Poor (S&P) - to examine: (i) the decision to voluntarily seek a
rating, and (ii) the determinants of the letter ratings duly assigned.
There are two main reasons why we consider the UK to be a highly suitable environment
within which to conduct this study. First, with life and non-life annual premiums in 1997 of £110
billion  (US$176 billion), the UK insurance market is the fifth largest in the world after the United
States (US), Japan, Germany and France, and contributes substantially to the national economy
(Association of British Insurers, 1998). As such, the results of this study should be comparable
with evidence from other major insurance markets in which credit rating agencies are used such as
those in the US and much of Western Europe. Second, like the US, the UK credit rating industry
faces increasing institutional pressures, primarily in the form of stronger market competition. As a
result, this study should provide a sound basis for comparison with prior US-based research (e.g.,
Brotman, 1989; Bouzouita and Young, 1998; Pottier, 1997, 1998; Pottier and Sommer, 1999)
and, as mentioned earlier, serve as a stimulus for further credit rating-based research in other
insurance markets.
By comparing the rating activities of A.M. Best and S&P we are able to establish whether
insurers’ decisions to be rated and the determinants of the ratings themselves differ according to
the methods used and range of activities traditionally undertaken by rating agencies. In particular,
two major differences exist between the rating firms examined in this study. First, while S&P have
historically concentrated on rating individual debt issues and only begun ratings of insurance firms
relatively recently, A.M. Best have always specialised in the assessment of insurance firms,2 and as
such, the firm is often the preferred choice for insurance companies (Pottier and Sommer, 1999).
Second, approximately 80 per cent of the ratings currently assigned to UK insurers by S&P are
based solely on publicly-available financial information, whereas A.M. Best bases all its ratings on
a combination of publicly-available financial data and inside information provided during company
visits. The financial tests performed by A.M. Best measure corporate financial performance in
terms of profitability, liquidity and capital structure. The qualitative analysis includes an evaluation
of an insurer’s spread of risk, managerial expertise, adequacy of systems of internal control, and
so on (Pottier, 1997). By comparing A.M. Best and S&P data in this study we are therefore able
to distinguish between the influence of public and non-public information on insurance companies’
ratings.
Five motivations further underpin this study. First, an investigation into the impact of
company-specific factors on financial distress prediction could help improve the understanding of
business risks and may, therefore, have important policy-making implications (Borde et l, 1994).
For example, if financial ratios are found to be good predictors of the financial strength of insurers
then the use of credit rating agencies could, as in some countries (e.g., New Zealand), substitute
for costly industry regulation. Second, insights into the determinants of credit ratings could assist
industry regulators, policyholders, and investors when deciding whether or not to rely on the
ratings assigned by credit rating firms. For instance, the absence of a linkage between ratings and
important measures of financial risk (e.g., capital adequacy) could lead commentators to question
the relevance and robustness of ratings assigned to insurance companies. Third, this study has the
potential to shed light on the extent to which credit rating agencies are truly independent
intermediaries or whether, instead, they are heavily influenced by institutional factors. For
example, Klein (1992) reports evidence of growing public concern that credit rating agencies in
the US appear to modify their ratings in response to pressure from the insurance industry, possibly
in an attempt to improve policyholders’ confidence after some high profile insurance company
failures. Fourth, mutuals and non-publicly listed stock companies often play an important role in
the insurance industry, but the value of these forms of organization cannot be ascertained from
secondary markets. Credit rating agencies can therefore perform an important role for investors
and policyholders in reporting on the financial standing of such companies and a better
understanding of the factors which determine assigned ratings is likely to be of interest to
stakeholders in non-listed insurance organizations. Fifth, the academic literature on the
determinants of the financial strength of insurance companies, particularly outside of the US, is
limited (Pottier and Sommer, 1999). Our research therefore contributes to the extant literature by
                                                                                                                              
2 Although A.M. Best have rated the financial condition of US insurers since the 1920’s (Cantor and Packer, 1995,
1997) the use of credit rating agencies outside North America is a more recent phenomenon; for example the firm
presenting evidence about the factors that explain letter ratings assigned to UK-based direct
insurers and provides a basis against which prior and future research can be compared and
evaluated. The present study also improves upon previous US-based research in that it uses panel
data from both the life and general insurance industries, thereby enabling robust estimates of
cross-business-type effects to be derived.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides background
information on the use of credit ratings in insurance markets. Section II provides the framework
and Section III discusses the research design. Section IV presents our empirical results, while
Section V concludes the paper.
I. Background
The key function of credit rating agencies is to analyze and grade the financial strength of
issuers of public securities, including insurers, and thereby assess companies’ ability to fulfil their
contractual obligations to consumers, creditors and other contracting constituents.3 Many
researchers, such as Singh and Power (1992), Ambrose and Seward (1988), Ambrose and Carroll
(1994) and Pottier (1997, 1998), have now acknowledged the important role played by credit
rating agencies in alleviating the effects of information imperfections in insurance markets.A  a
consequence, accurate ratings help to prevent reckless risk-taking by insurers (Carson and Scott,
1997). In this regard, credit rating agencies have an important role to play in supplementing the
solvency monitoring systems of insurance industry regulators, as well as enhancing the screening
and monitoring activities of investment analysts and providers of corporate debt. Insurance firms
use letter ratings to convey the adequacy of their financial condition to a broad group of potential
users, including investors, policyholders, industry regulators and brokers. Strong ratings can also
                                                                                                                              
only began rating UK insurers in the 1980s.
3 The salient difference between insurance company ratings and corporate bond ratings is that with the former the
ability to meet policyholders’ claims is being assessed, whereas a bond rating applies to the security of a particular
debt issue (Pottier and Sommer, 1999). While corporate ratings are carried out periodically (normally monthly) or
after critical events (e.g., a catastrophe, corporate take-over, and so on), credit rating agencies monitor the effects
of organizational and market developments and thus proceed on an ongoing basis (Cantor and Packer, 1995).
provide insurers with better access to funds and enable them to reduce their market cost of capital
(Pottier and Sommer, 1999).
Although the nature of the insurance company rating process is well-known, the extent to
which interaction between credit rating agencies and the management of insurance companies
enhances the robustness of the assigned rating is not well-established in the literature. For
example, Ambrose and Seward (1988) find that financial ratios and assigned credit ratings
provided by A.M. Best are equally efficient in predicting insurance company insolvency in the US.
Their analysis therefore suggests that the supplementary inside (qualitative) information gathered
by A.M. Best during their visits to insurance companies does not contribute any useful
incremental information as to corporate financial condition and default risk. This result has
potentially important implications for users of letter ratings (e.g., industry regulators, brokers)
who employ credit rating agencies because they perceive their inside knowledge of managerial
operations and systems to be both credible and valuable. The situation described above can be
further exacerbated by a lack of public knowledge of the credit rating function. For example,
Pottier (1997, p. 112) states that in the insurance industry “ . . . rating agencies provide general
information on the rating process [but] . . . do not disclose the relative importance of the
quantitative measures used.”
II. Framework
The standard financial ratios used to assess the financial condition of insurance companies
(and other financial services companies such as banks) normally focus on capital adequacy,
management operations, earnings and liquidity (the so-called CAMEL criteria). These m asures
are incorporated in the Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) of the US-based
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to assist in solvency monitoring and
control (Carson and Scott, 1997) as well as having been used in previous insurance industry
studies as a basis for modelling the rating process (e.g., see Pottier, 1997). In this study, we
therefore investigate the relation between seven corporate-specific variables - capital adequacy,
profitability, liquidity, growth, company size, organisational form, reinsurance and business
activity – and (i) insurance firms decision to volunteer for an external rating by A.M. Best or S&P
plus (ii) the determinants of the ratings themselves. Our framework, including the definition of
variables, is considered in further detail below.
A. Capital Adequacy
Capital adequacy, which reflects an insurance company’s exposure to operational and
financial risks (e.g., poor underwriting results), is used in this study as an inverse measure of
corporate financial leverage. As in Bouzouita and Young (1998), this is defined as the ratio of
accumulated reserves to total assets (RES).
Cantor and Packer (1997) claim that high levels of leverage are frequently associated with
increased uncertainty about a firm’s ability to meet its claims. Borde et al. (1994, p. 181) share
this view and state that risk “ . . . can be influenced by the [insurance] company’s degree of
leverage, since leverage tends to magnify corporate returns or losses . . . ”. This in turn suggests
that managers of highly leveraged insurers will not voluntarily secure a letter rating since a low
rating is likely to exacerbate market uncertainties about their ability to meet contractual claims. In
addition to measuring insurers’ abilities to meet their fiscal obligations, the leverage proxy that we
employ reflects an insurer’s ability to write new business without undue financial strain on its
capital base4. We contend that the higher the financial leverage, the greater the potential adverse
effects of variations in underwriting performance and economic shocks on an insurer’s ability to
meet its commitments to policyholders and investors. That is, the larger an insurance firm’s
leverage ratio, the greater the risk of financial distress and default on claims. Some authors (e.g.,
Jensen, 1986) suggest, however, that high leverage (and the associated risk of default) can help in
disciplining managers to act in the interests of fixed and residual claimants by preventing wasteful
investment of free cash flow, and may therefore represent a positive attribute for insurers.
                                         
4Insurers, particularly those operating in life insurance markets, often incur high expenses when acquiring new
business (e.g., in the form of medical expenses and sales commission). This can place a considerable strain on the
insurer’s ability to undertake new insurance unless there is an adequate capital base.
Nonetheless, most prior studies (e.g., Brotman, 1989; Pottier, 1997, 1998) view high financial
leverage as a negative feature of insurance companies’ capital structure and we therefore predict a
negative relation between leverage and both insurance company ratings and the likelihood of
being rated, other things being equal.
B. Profitability
Like Bouzouita and Young (1998), we define profitability as the ratio of annual
investment and underwriting income (net of expenses), plus unrealized capital gains, to statutory
capital (PROFIT).
Examination of profitability enables financial analysts and industry regulators to assess an
insurer’s ability to invest annual surpluses efficiently in order to generate new business (Fok, et
al., 1997; Bouzouita and Young, 1998; Pottier, 1998). In addition to providing an indication of an
insurer’s ability to remain as a going concern, measures of profitability also provide insights into
management’s ability to control expenses effectively and to set competitive rates of premium.
Managers of profitable companies are expected to obtain a letter rating in order to enhance the
corporate  market profile and secure future new business. Moreover, Brotman (1989), Bouzouita
and Young (1998), and others, contend that, in general, the higher the level of profitability, the
better the insurance company’s assigned credit rating. We therefore hypothesize that, other things
being equal, there will be a positive linkage between insurance companies’ profitability and (i)
their propensity to seek a rating, as well as (ii) their assigned letter ratings.
C. Liquidity
The settlement of policyholders’ claims as they fall due is a critical task for insurance
companies (Brotman, 1989; Ambrose and Carroll, 1994; Borde et al., 1994) and so we treat
liquidity as an explanatory variable in this study. Liquidity (LIQ) is measured here by the ratio of
current assets to current liabilities and therefore represents insurers’ ability to fulfil their
                                                                                                                              
immediate obligations to policyholders in the event of claims (Pottier, 1998). It is plausible that
managers of highly liquid insurers will be keen to signal their claims-paying ability to the markets
through the rating process in order to promote their reputations for prudent management. In
which case liquidity will be an important factor in the corporate decision to obtain a credit rating.
If liquidity is too high, however, managers are provided with the means to invest in projects with
negative net present values, reducing owners’ wealth while simultaneously increasing managerial
remuneration packages via the consumption of perquisites and the receipt of company size-related
bonuses. Nonetheless, most prior studies (e.g., Carson and Scott, 1997; Bouzouita and Young,
1998) report the existence of a negative relation between insurance companies’ liquidity risk and
their credit ratings. As a consequence, we also predict that the better an insurer’s liquidity, the
higher will be both its credit rating and its probability of being rated, other things being equal.
D. Growth
Previous studies (e.g., Bouzouita and Young, 1998; Pottier and Sommer, 1998) have used
the absolute change in annual reported surplus (GROWTH) to measure the prospective surety of
policyholders’ fixed claims in periods of adverse economic conditions.
Positive growth in annual surplus could be indicative of a favorable financial condition.
Consequently, we predict that insurers achieving high growth in business are more likely to
volunteer for a credit rating than insurers achieving low growth. However, significant new
business growth could be due to low underwriting standards and under-pricing, and as such, result
in greater uncertainty as to the adequacy of the insurer as a going concern. In other words,
insurers that experience substantive growth in annual reported surplus could be subject to a high
level of underwriting risk (Borde et al. 1994; Pottier, 1997). However, prior US-based insurance
industry studies (e.g., Pottier and Sommer, 1998) find that business growth is associated with
higher credit ratings because in practice it indicates the prospect of strong future cash flow
performance and improved economic value. As a consequence, we predict that, other things being
equal, growth in annual reported surplus will be positively related to the level of rating assigned to
an insurer as well as the propensity to seek a rating.
E. Company Size
In most studies of the insurance industry, company size is measured as the natural
logarithm of total admitted assets because of the highly skewed distribution of total assets among
firms operating in the insurance industry (Pottier and Sommer, 1997). Accordingly, this surrogate
of insurance company size (LNSIZE) is also used here.
Bouzouita and Young (1998) suggest that company size is likely to be positively
correlated with assigned credit ratings because, amongst other things, larger entities have access
to a relatively wide pool of managerial expertise and are likely to realize economies of scale in
their operations. Large insurers are also likely to have prominent market positions and public
reputations for sound governance which prudent management will be keen to protect. These
attributes, when combined with accumulated reserves, should enable large insurers to survive the
impact of volatile underwriting climates and unfavorable economic conditions. Indeed, most prior
studies (e.g., Pottier, 1997, 1998; Bouzouita and Young, 1998) have found that large insurers
tend to have higher letter ratings than small insurers. As a consequence, we predict that large
insurers are more likely to volunteer for a credit rating than small insurers. We also expect to find
a positive relation between the size of insurers and their assigned credit rating, other things being
equal.
F. Organizational Form
Adams (1995), Mayers and Smith (1994) and Pottier and Sommer (1997) contend that
managerial decision-making in the insurance industry partly depends on whether a firm is a stock
company (i.e., shareholder-owned) or a mutual (i.e., policyholder-owned). For instance, risk-
taking, investment and product-mix decisions are expected to vary between stock companies and
mutuals as a direct result of their different ownership structures, contracting interests and internal
governance. Therefore, our study also examines organizational form (OFORM), with the attribute
treated as a dummy variable that takes the value 0 for a stock company and 1 for a mutual.
In much of the insurance literature, mutual insurers are associated with precautionary
managerial activities, behavior designed to promote policyholders’ fixed claims in the long-term,
whereas stock insurers are likely to engage in more risky activities in an attempt to maximize
shareholders’ short-term wealth (Adams, 1995). As a consequence, we predict that managers of
mutual insurers will be more inclined to obtain a credit rating to promote their reputation for
prudent management and protect their market share than will their counterparts in stock
companies. What is more, a number of insurance industry studies, including Cox and Griepentrog
(1988), suggest that high transaction and information costs, in conjunction with the indivisibility
of investment assets, cause shareholders of stock companies to diversify their business risks less
efficiently than conventional finance theory suggests. The studies claim that the existence of
market frictions leave stock companies at greater risk of financial distress than mutual
organizations. Indeed, Pottier (1997) cites evidence that in the US life insurance industry, mutuals
are more highly rated than stock companies. We therefore predict that, all things being equal,
mutual insurers are more likely to both seek an external credit assessment and receive a higher
rating than are stock insurers.
G. Reinsurance
The likely effect of reinsurance on the rating assigned to an insurance company is not clear
from the literature. By transferring risk to a third party, reinsurance can help to reduce uncertainty
regarding the frequency and magnitude of future losses and enable a primary insurer to sustain an
external economic shock (Adams, 1996). On the other hand, the insolvency of a reinsurance
company could adversely affect the financial strength of the primary insurer, particularly in cases
where the primary insurer was heavily reinsured. Clearly, the latter situation would complicate the
assessment of a primary insurer’s future financial condition and its ability to fulfil its obligations to
policyholders, investors and others. In their recent US-based study, Pottier and Sommer (1999)
did indeed find a negative relation between the amount of reinsurance undertaken and the letter
rating assigned by leading agencies, suggesting that the insurance and investment markets view
substantive reliance on reinsurance unfavorably. This reasoning suggests that, all else being equal,
highly reinsured companies are less likely to volunteer for a credit rating than entities with less
reinsurance. Additionally, for the insurance market as a whole, we expect that lowly reinsured
insurance companies will be assigned higher letter ratings than highly reinsured insurance
companies (and vice versa). As in Adams (1996), we define our reinsurance variable (REINS) as
the ratio of annual reinsurance ceded over annual premiums written and hypothesize a negative
relation between the variable and both the propensity to seek a rating and the rating itself.
H. Business Activity
Insurance companies may specialize in either short-term (e.g., vehicle insurance) or long-
term business (e.g., life insurance). Alternatively, they may engage in a combination of both short
and long-term operating lines and hence operate as composite insurers. Traditionally, long-term
(e.g., life) insurance liabilities have been fairly predictable because of the application of actuarial
principles in policy valuation. Moreover, the maintenance of statutory levels of solvency have
helped to allay public concerns regarding life insurers’ abilities to meet policyholders’ future
claims (Borde et al., 1994). This suggests that, other things being equal, life insurers are less likely
to need a credit rating than are property-liability (general) insurers.
In recent years, however, unanticipated financial market risks, such as interest rate swings
and foreign exchange rate movements, have shown that for many life insurers the actuarial value
of their long-term assets and liabilities have been substantially mis-stated (Santomero and Babbel,
1997). The promotion of guaranteed annuity and investment contracts has also increased life
insurers’ exposure to insolvency risk relative to that faced by general insurers (Carson and Scott,
1997). Moreover, increased competition in life insurance markets has resulted in higher sales
commission being paid to brokers and sales agents, which has in turn led to a strain being placed
on the capital base of many life insurers (Adams, 1994). In the UK, the mis-selling of personal
pensions has further increased many life insurers’ liabilities and this has undoubtedly had adverse
consequences for the assigned credit ratings of many life insurance companies (e.g., see Lees,
1997). In contrast, insurers writing short-term property-liability business have been somewhat
better placed to adjust to unanticipated losses because of the ability to vary annual premiums,
reduce operating costs and maintain volumes (e.g., through the use of new technology), and
change underwriting terms at short notice. Additionally, composite insurance companies have
been better able to manage their financial risks by holding a broad portfolio of insurance and
investment products. This attribute should enable composite insurers, in particular, to diversify
unanticipated movements in the value of their assets and liabilities across a wider pool of
insurance risks than pure life insurers (Carson and Scott, 1997). Accordingly, we predict that,
other things being equal, general and composite insurers will be more likely to volunteer for an
external credit rating, and generally gain higher ratings, than pure life insurance companies. Line
of business activity (BUS) is incorporated in our model by the use of a variable taking the value 0
for life insurers, 1 for property-liability (general) insurers and 2 for composites.
III. Data and Models
Annual data were obtained for the 40 or so UK-based insurers that were rated by A.M.
Best and the 25 UK-based insurers that were rated by S&P between the years 1993 and 1997
inclusive5,6. Additionally, we collected a control sample of 28 UK-based insurers that were not
rated by A.M. Best, S&P, or any other credit rating agency over the five-year period studied. The
period 1993-97 represents the earliest and latest years for which complete information on all A.M.
Best-rated and S&P-rated insurance companies were available at the time our study was carried
out. The primary source of data that we used was the A.M. Best Insurance Companies Directory
                                         
5 Reinsurance companies and Lloyds were excluded from our study because they are substantively different from
direct insurers. For example, reinsurance companies do not write direct business and are therefore not subject to
the same underwriting risks as conventional insurers. Lloyds, meanwhile, is not a corporate form of organization,
but is instead a collection of underwriting interests (or Names). The Lloyds market also operates a three year
accounting cycle to reflect the special (long-tail) nature of much of the risks that it insures/reinsures.
6 The number of A.M. Best-rated companies varied across years as follows: 38 in 1997; 40 in 1996, 39 in 1995; 39
in 1994; and 39 in 1993. Our total A.M. Best sample thus represents an unbalanced panel of 195 company/year
observations. Few UK insurers use the ratings of Moody’s Investors Services, s  tests involving this agency could
not be undertaken.
(1999). This was supplemented by data obtained from A.M. Best and S&P International Insurer
Ratings Lists, the DYP UK insurance companies’ database and insurance company annual reports.
The empirical study is divided into two main parts. First, we estimate a ‘rating decision’
multinomial logit model to determine the main influences on an insurance company’s decision to
select either an A.M. Best rating, a S&P rating or no rating. In this study, the dummy decision
variable (j) is set equal to 0 for non-rated insurers, 1 for S&P-rated insurers and 2 for A.M. Best-
rated insurers. The model to be estimated may be written in general form as:
Prob [choice j]  =  
å
j
j
j
xe
xe
'
'
a
a
j = 0, 1, 2
where 'ja  is a vector of the parameters to be estimated for each j andx is the vector of
independent variables, as discussed in Section II. These independent variables are the inverse
measure of leverage (RES), profitability (PROFIT), liquidity (LIQ), surplus growth (GROWTH),
the natural logarithm of company size (LNSIZE), organisational form (OFORM), reinsurance
(REINS) and business activity (BUS).
Second, we estimate ‘rating determination’ ordered probit models (with sample selection)
for the A.M. Best-rated and S&P-rated insurance companies separately. Insurance company
ratings are ordinal measurements and, as such, their analysis necessitates the estimation of an
ordered probit model, as developed by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975). This type of regression
model was also used by Pottier and Sommer (1999). However, since A.M. Best and S&P do not
rate the full population of UK insurers, but rather only those companies applying voluntarily for a
letter rating, our data set is potentially subject to self-selection bias (Greene, 1999). We control
for this by extending the standard sample selection model of Heckman (1979) to the ordered
probit model in the manner prescribed by Durbin and Rivers (1990) and Greene (1999). In this
modified model, the ordinal random variable is assessed for self-selection bias by testing the
correlation (r) between the error terms in a ‘rating decision’ probit model and the ‘rating
determination’ ordered probit model. The null hypothesis that selection bias does not exist is then
r = 0.
For each rating agency, the estimation is conducted in two stages. First, we estimate a
‘rating decision’ probit equation, with the dummy dependent variable set equal to 0 for non-rated
insurance companies and equal to 1 for rated insurance companies. Second, we estimate the
‘rating determination’ ordered probit equation, with a coded value for the credit rating employed
as the ordinal dependent variable. In this second stage, the coefficients of both models (including
r) are re-estimated using a full-information maximum likelihood technique, which ensures that the
correlation between the error terms in the two models is taken into account. In the estimation
procedure, our absolute measured financial data were deflated by the relevant average annual
retail price index (base year = 1993) in order to counteract the effects of inflation. Insurers that
were not assigned a rating for reasons such as a lack of information or insufficient operating
experience were excluded from the study.
The ‘rating decision’ probit model and the ‘rating determination’ ordered probit model
(with sample selection) may be written in general form as:
ititit uxd += '
* a
0=itd   if  0
* £itd
      = 1  if  0* >itd
ititit exy += '
* b
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      = 1  if  1
*
0 mm £< ity
      = 2  if  2
*
1 mm £< ity
      = 3  if  2
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itit eu , ~ N(0,0,1,1,r)
[ ]itit xy ,  is observed if and only if 1=itd
In these models, the latent variables, d* and y*, are continuous, unobserved variables: d*
may be interpreted as the propensity to obtain a rating, while y* represents the propensity to be
assigned a particular rating. The binary variable, d, equals 0 for an insurer that has no rating and 1
for an insurer with a rating. The ordinal variable, y, is coded on a four-point scale from 0 to 3,
where 0 represents the poorest condition and 3 superior financial strength7. In both models, x
represents a vector of independent variables and a¢ and b¢ are the vectors of coefficients to be
estimated. The two error terms, u and e are assumed to be normally distributed with means equal
to zero, variances equal to one and a correlation coefficient equal to r.
The eight independent variables are predicted to have the same directional influence on
both the decision to be rated and the ratings themselves, for the reasons set out in Section II, and
so the equations to be estimated may be written in full as:
*
itd   =  a0  +  a1RESit  +  a2PROFITit  +  a3LIQit  + a4GROWTHit +  a5LNSIZEit  +
a6OFORMit
 +  a7REINSit  +  a8BUSit  +  uit 
*
ity   =  b0  +  b1RESit  +  b2PROFITit  +  b3LIQit  +  b4GROWTHit  + b5LNSIZEit  + b6OFORMit
+  b7REINSit  +  b8BUSit  +  eit 
                                         
7  A.M. Best defines superior strength as A++/A+ (coded here as 3); excellent as both A (coded 2) and A- (coded
1); very good as B++ (also coded 1); and good, adequate or uncertain claims-paying ability as B+ and below (coded
0). S&P define superior strength as AAA, excellent as AA+/AA/AA- and very good as A+ (all coded here as 3);
good as A (coded 2) and A- (coded 1) and adequate or uncertain claims-paying ability as BBB+ and below (coded
0). The chosen codings reflect our judgement given the distributional properties of the observed data set.
IV. Results
A. Descriptive Data
Panel A of Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of the independent variables
used in the study. Separate figures are given for the A.M. Best-rated, S&P-rated and non-rated
companies in the sample. The most striking finding to emerge from an inspection of these figures
is the large variation in surplus growth rates across the sample, particularly for the A.M. Best-
rated insurance companies that have a coefficient of variation of 5.49. However, when the data
for each A.M. Best-rated company were examined, it emerged that this figure was largely driven
by an observation of 992 percent in 1997 for the newly-merged conglomerate of Royal Sun
Alliance; removing this observation from the sample causes the coefficient of variation to fall to
2.3.
Panel B of the table details the number of insurance firms obtaining each of our coded
values of the A.M. Best and S&P rating categories in all five years of the sample period. The
results show that in all years, over 90 percent of the A.M. Best-rated insurers were given an A- or
higher rating and categorised as ‘excellent’ or ‘superior’. This proportion is higher than that found
for US property-liability insurers by Pottier and Sommer (1999), who report that just over 72
percent of all A.M. Best-rated insurers in their study were classified as ‘excellent’ or ‘superior’ in
1996. The S&P-rated insurers in our sample generally have substantially lower ratings than those
assigned by A.M. Best; only 64 percent of the S&P-rated insurers were assigned an A- or higher
rating (roughly equivalent to a B+ A.M. Best rating) in 1993-95, rising to 88 percent in 1996-97.
These proportions are lower than that those reported for US property-liability insurers by Pottier
and Sommer (1999) who found that over 93 percent of the S&P-rated insurers in their sample
were assigned ratings of A- or higher. The figures in Panel B of Table 1 also reflect that the S&P
ratings for UK insurers changed more often than those of A.M. Best over the sample period.
 Finally, Panel C of the table provides a matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients for all
the independent variables included in the model. The correlation coefficients between pairs of
independent variables are generally low (all are less than 0.53), which suggests that
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem. Nevertheless, since collinearity can exist among more
than two independent variables, we computed variance-inflation factors (VIFs) by regressing each
independent variable in turn on all the others and then calculating 1/(1 – R2). As the calculated
VIFs are all less than 1.60, we can be reasonably confident that multicollinearity is not a problem
in this study8.
B. The rating decision multinomial logit model
The ‘rating decision’ multinomial logit estimation results are shown in Table 2.
Interpreting the parameter estimates in this model is not straightforward, so we concentrate here
on the statistical significance of the estimates and the marginal effects. Leverage, profitability,
liquidity, company size and business activity prove to have statistically significant influences (at
the five percent level, one tail) on the probability of selecting an A.M. Best rating. Similarly,
profitability, liquidity, company size, reinsurance and business activity all have significant
influences on the probability of selecting an S&P rating. According to the marginal effects, an
increase in RES (i.e., a decrease in financial leverage) reduces the probability of selecting an A.M.
Best rating, but increases the probability of being non-rated or S&P-rated. Increases in PROFIT,
LIQ or BUS increase the probability of being A.M. Best-rated and reduce the probability of being
non-rated or S&P-rated, while increases in LNSIZE or REINS reduce the probability of being
rated by either agency.
                                         
8 See Gujarati (1995, pp. 338-339), for a discussion of ‘rule-of-thumb’ methods of detecting multicollinearity.
Gujarati suggests that a VIF in excess of 10 would indicate a high degree of collinearity.
C. The rating decision probit models
The ‘rating decision’ probit estimation results are summarised in Table 3. Three models
are estimated: the first examines the decision to be A.M. Best-rated or non-rated, the second
examines the decision to be S&P-rated or non-rated and the third examines the decision to be
rated (by A.M. Best or S&P) or non-rated. The results are generally consistent with those
obtained using the multinomial logit model shown in Table 2.
In the first model, leverage, profitability, liquidity, company size and business activity all
have statistically significant influences (at the five percent level, one tail) on the decision to be
rated by A.M. Best, while reinsurance and organizational form are not statistically significant. The
estimated coefficients of LNSIZE and the inverse measure of leverage, RES, both have negative
signs, suggesting that smaller insurance companies with higher leverage have a greater propensity
to be A.M. Best-rated. This could be motivated by a desire among small insurers to increase their
market profile and secure new business from larger, more established, operatives. The estimated
coefficients of LIQ and PROFIT have positive signs, suggesting that insurance companies with
higher levels of liquidity and profitability have a greater propensity to be A.M. Best-rated. The
estimated coefficient of BUS is also positive, which suggests that composite insurers have a
greater propensity to be A.M. Best-rated than pure life or general insurers.
In the second model, profitability, liquidity, surplus growth, company size, reinsurance and
business activity are all significant at the five percent level in a single tail test as influences on the
decision to be S&P-rated, while leverage is insignificant. The estimated coefficients of LNSIZE,
LIQ and REINS all have negative signs, suggesting that smaller insurance companies with lower
levels of liquidity and reinsurance will have a greater propensity to be S&P-rated. The estimated
coefficients of PROFIT, GROWTH and BUS are all positive, suggesting that faster-growing
composite insurers with higher levels of profitability have a greater propensity to be S&P-rated.
In the third model, leverage, profitability, surplus growth, company size, reinsurance and
business activity are all significant influences on the decision to be rated (by either A.M. Best or
S&P). The estimated coefficients of RES, LNSIZE and REINS are negative, suggesting that
smaller insurers with less reinsurance and more leverage have a greater propensity to be rated.
The estimated coefficients of PROFIT, GROWTH and BUS are positive, suggesting that faster
growing, composite insurers with higher levels of profitability are more likely to seek a rating.
However, the estimated coefficient of LIQ, which was significantly positive in the A.M. Best
regression and significantly negative in the S&P regression, is insignificant in the overall
regression in a one tail test.
According to Pottier and Sommer (1999), the main influence on an insurers’ decision to
be rated is likely to be uncertainty, as insurance firms often seek a rating in order to reduce market
uncertainty about their value and/or chances of insolvency. Our results tend to support this view.
In particular, it is plausible that smaller insurers with relatively high levels of financial leverage and
profitability may be regarded as less secure in their going concern status by industry regulators,
potential investors and customers, and might, therefore, be more likely to seek a rating than large
insurers.
The other statistics listed in Table 3 include a c2 statistic for testing the null hypothesis
that the regression coefficients (excluding the intercept term) are all zero. The c2 v lues of 368.7,
196.4 and 327.5 respectively allow us to reject this hypothesis. The Kullback-Leibler R2 valu s of
0.81, 0.44 and 0.58 suggest reasonably good fits9. Finally, from the cross-tabulation of actual and
predicted values of the rating decision dummy variable, it can be seen that the estimated models
correctly predict the A.M. Best rating decision in 317 out of the 335 cases, the S&P rating
decision in 228 out of 265 cases and the overall rating in 408 out of 460 cases.
D. The rating determination ordered probit models
The results obtained from estimating the ‘rating determination’ ordered probit model with
sample selection are shown separately for the A.M. Best-rated and S&P-rated samples in Table 4.
In the A.M. Best regression, just three out of the seven independent variables included in the
model have statistically significant effects on the assigned rating, namely profitability, liquidity and
organizational form, all of which have the expected positive signs. The results thus enable us to
conclude that mutual insurance companies with higher-than-average levels of profitability and
                                         
9 The Kullback-Leibler R2 is a measure of goodness-of-fit relative to a model with just a constant term.
liquidity tend to have higher A.M. Best ratings. Of the other independent variables, business
growth, company size, business activity and reinsurance all have the expected signs, but are not
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level (in one-tailed tests). The inverse measure of
leverage, RES, has an unexpectedly negative sign and is insignificant. The estimate of the error
correlation coefficient, r, is 0.75 with a standard error of 0.31. This suggests that selection bias is
present in our sample of A.M. Best-rated companies and justifies the application of the ordered
probit model with selection.
In the S&P regression, only two of the six independent variables have significant
influences on the assigned rating, these being leverage and liquidity. The inverse measure of
leverage RES has an unexpectedly negative sign, while liquidity has the expected positive sign. Of
the other independent variables, profitability and business activity have positive signs as predicted,
while company size and reinsurance have unexpected negative and positive signs respectively. The
estimate of the error correlation coefficient, r, is only 0.06 with a standard error of 1.66,
suggesting that selection bias is not present in the sample of S&P-rated insurance companies.
In interpreting the ordered probit results, it is important to emphasize that the coefficients
are not the same as the marginal effects. In our models, where we assume a normal distribution
and in which y can take on four values (0, 1, 2 or 3), we can write the probabilities (P) associat d
with each y-value as:
P(y = 0)  =  F(-b¢x)
P(y = 1)  =  F(m1  - b¢x) - F(-b¢x)
P(y = 2)  =  F(m2  - b¢x) - F(m1  - b¢x)
P(y = 3)  =  1  -  F(m2  - b¢x)
where F is the cumulative normal distribution function. The marginal effects are then given by:
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where j is the standard normal density function. These partial derivatives were calculated for each
independent variable in our two models and the results are shown in the bottom half of Table 4. In
these models, with four y-categories, it is likely that the marginal effects will have opposite signs
to those of the coefficients for y = 0and y = 1, but the same signs for y = 2 and y = 3.
In both the A.M. Best and S&P models, we find that an increase in PROFIT, LIQor BUS
will reduce the probability of being assigned a 0 or 1 coded (‘low’) rating and increase the
probability of being assigned a (‘high’) 2 or 3. However, Table 4 also shows that, in both models,
a higher value of RES (i.e., lower financial leverage) increases the probability of being assigned a
0 or 1 rating and reduces the probability of a 2 or 3. The two models differ with respect to the
effects of a change in company size and reinsurance. For the A.M. Best-rated insurance
companies, an increase in LNSIZE or a decrease in REINS will increase the probability of being
assigned a 0 or 1 rating and reduce the probability of a 2 or 3 while exactly the opposite applies to
the S&P-rated insurance companies. Finally, a change in OFORM from stock to mutual will
reduce the probability of being assigned an A.M. Best-rating of 0 or 1 and increase the probability
of a 2 or 3.
The other statistics listed in Table 4 include Chow test results (F = 0.18 and 0.32
respectively), which do not allow us to reject the hypothesis of temporal stability over the five
years of the study10. Finally, an inspection of plots of the residuals on LNSIZE revealed no
evidence of heteroskedasticity. To test this further, Breusch-Pagan c2 statistics were calculated
                                         
10 The use of pooled cross-section and time-series data is justifiable if there is both temporal and cross-sectional
stability. With only five years of observations and seven independent variables, it is not possible to test for cross-
sectional stability, but we test for temporal stability by estimating the rating decision model for the first and second
halves of the period 1993-97 and then calculating the Chow F statistic.
after first regressing the squares of the standardized residuals on all the independent variables
included in the two models. The calculated values of 7.96 and 5.89 (compared with a critical
value of 14.07 at the fiv  percent level of significance) confirm that the hypothesis of
homoskedasticity cannot be rejected.
V.  Conclusions
This is the first study to investigate the rating decision by UK insurance companies using
logit and probit models that control for self-selection bias, and the first to focus specifically on
credit ratings assigned to life, property-liability and composite insurance companies by A.M. Best
and S&P. Our approach is justified by the finding of a statistically significant degree of correlation
between the error terms in the A.M. Best ‘rating decision’ and ‘rating determination’ models.
Our first main finding is that the decision to be rated by either A.M. Best or S&P is
positively related to an insurer’s profitability, leverage and surplus growth, and negatively related
to company size and the extent of reinsurance. We also find that composite insurers have a greater
propensity to obtain a rating than pure life insurers or general insurers. These results lend some
support to the view expressed by Pottier and Sommer (1999 that insurers frequently seek to
obtain ratings in order to resolve ex anteuncertainty about their levels of financial risk and
solvency. However, there are some differences in the determinants of the decision for insurers to
be A.M. Best-rated or S&P-rated. For example, insurance companies with higher levels of
liquidity are more likely to select an A.M. Best rating and less likely to select an S&P rating. Also,
the results of estimating the multinomial logit model suggest that a decrease in leverage will
reduce the likelihood of selecting an A.M. Best rating, but increase the probability of selecting a
S&P rating. Similarly, an increase in profitability will increase the probability of selecting an A.M.
Best rating and reduce the probability of selecting an S&P rating. These observations imply that
insurance company managers may be more open to a visit by A.M. Best representatives when
financial conditions are good than when they are relatively less favorable.
Our second major finding concerns the ratings assigned by A.M. Best and S&P. We find
that the ratings assigned by A.M. Best are related to profitability, liquidity and organizational
form. In particular, we have strong evidence to support the hypothesis that higher levels of
profitability and liquidity lead to higher A.M. Best ratings and that mutual insurers tend to have
higher A.M. Best ratings than stock insurers. This latter finding lends support to the view
expressed by Adams (1995) that mutual insurers tend to engage in more precautionary managerial
behavior and less risk-taking than do stock insurers, who face market pressures to maximize
shareholder wealth. Although not statistically significant, our estimates of the coefficients for
company size, reinsurance and business activity have the expected signs and so lend weak support
to the hypotheses that larger companies with less reinsurance will have higher ratings, and that
general and composite insurers will have higher ratings than life insurers. How ver, the inverse
measure of leverage, RES has an unexpectedly negative sign and is insignificant, a result that may
cast doubt on the robustness and reliability of credit ratings.
Turning to the ratings assigned by S&P, we find that the two significant determinants are
liquidity and leverage. As with the A.M. Best ratings and in line with our prior expectations, a
higher level of liquidity leads to a higher S&P rating. Contrary to our expectations, however, we
find a significant negative relation between RES and the S&P rating, suggesting that insurers with
higher financial leverage will be more likely to be assigned a higher S&P rating. In terms,
therefore, of the decision to seek an external credit assessment and, more markedly, the
determinants of the ratings, a number of differences exist between the findings relating to A.M.
Best and S&P. Whether or not these variations in the results can be attributed directly to
differences in the historical nature of the two agencies’ rating businesses, their different
assessment procedures, or their sources of information, is a topic worthy of investigation in the
future.
We believe that the results of our research have potentially important implications for
firms operating in the insurance market as well as for policy-makers. For example, the evidence
that mutual insurers are generally assigned higher ratings than stock companies suggests that
certain publicly-traded insurance firms, in particular new entrants, might not possess sound
financial strength and may require closer regulatory scrutiny than more established insurers. Also,
the finding that liquidity has a significantly positive effect on ratings assigned by both firms should
provide a measure of confidence in the robustness of the ratings to industry regulators,
policyholders and investors in the UK, and might imply that such ratings could eventually play a
role in substituting for costly industry regulation. From the point of view of UK insurance firms
considering applying for an external credit assessment, the most important findings of this study
are that, although the factors influencing the decision to be rated by A.M. Best or S&P are
broadly the same, a degree of variability exists in the variables which influence the actual ratings
themselves. Insurance company managers and other parties (e.g., industry regulators) should be
aware of this when contemplating whether to seek such a rating and which agency to choose for
the assessment.
Whilst we believe that this study fills an important gap in the literature about players in the
important UK insurance market, we acknowledge that interpretation of the results of this study
should be tempered by inherent limitations in the research design, such as the use of a relatively
small sample size compared with US studies. However, we have attempted to derive robust
results, for example, through the use of panel data and by employing the ordered probit model in a
form which takes full account of possible self-selection bias. In conclusion, we hope that this
study will stimulate more research into the impact of company-specific factors on the financial
strength of insurance firms and indeed, the likelihood of financial distress in the vitally important
financial services sector as a whole.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of UK Insurance Companies
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of financial and insurance firm data used in the study. The
sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 195 company/year observations for UK-based insurance companies rated
by A.M. Best, 125 company/year observations for UK-based insurance companies rated by S&P, and a further 140
company/year observations for UK non-rated insurance companies, all for the period 1993-97. Panel A provides
descriptive data for the rated and non-rated insurers, while Panel B details the numbers of firms in each of A.M.
Best’s and S&P’s rating categories for the years 1993-97. Panel C shows the correlation matrix and variance-
inflation factors (VIF) for the independent variables used in the study, calculated from the total sample of 460
observations. RES is the ratio of accumulated reserves to total assets (an inverse measure of financial leverage).
PROFIT is the ratio of annual income plus unrealized capital gains to statutory capital. LIQ is the ratio of current
assets to current liabilities. GROWTH is the absolute change in reported annual surplus.  LNSIZE i  the natural
logarithm of total admitted assets. OFORM is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 for a stock (shareholder-
owned) company and 1 for a mutual (policyholder-owned) company. REINS is the ratio of annual reinsurance
ceded over annual premiums written. BUS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 for life insurers, 1 for
general insurers and 2 for composites. SD refers to standard deviation.
Panel A: Key Summary Statistics for the Sample
       A.M. Best          Standard and Poor     Non-rated Companies
Variables Mean    SD          Mean     SD       Mean      SD 
RES 0.73    0.12               0.88        0.06  0.90      0.09
PROFIT 0.33    0.11               0.08    0.05  0.07      0.08
LIQ 2.32    0.84               1.43    0.29  1.77      0.90
GROWTH              14.15      77.62             22.12       69.49 0.88      2.82
LNSIZE 2.78    0.71               6.51    1.76  7.60      1.55
OFORM 0.13    0.34               0.00    0.00  0.29      0.46
REINS 0.27    0.23               0.23    0.14  0.31      0.39
BUS 1.05    0.62               1.32    0.47  0.68      0.60
Panel B:  A.M. Best and S&P Ratings, 1993-97
Coded Rating Grade and Categorya No. of Firms
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
_____________________________________________________________________________
A.M. Best 3   A+/A++      Superior    6    6    6    6    5
29
2   A      Excellent  25  25  25  26  24 125
1   A-    Excellent     6    6    6    6    6   30
0   B++ or less  Very good or below   2        2        2        2        3       11
  39  39  39  40  38 195
S&P 3   A+ or aboveVery good or better   1    3    3    3    4   14
2   A      Good     8    6    6    6    5   31
1   A-    Good        7    7    8  13  13   48
0   B++ or less  Adequate or below   9        9        8        3        3       32
  25  25  25  25  25 125
Panel C:  Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix and Variance-Inflation Factors (VIFs)
  VIFs  Correlations
PROFIT     LIQ     GROWTH    LNSIZE   OFORM   REINS    BUS
RES 1.58   -0.52       -0.16         -0.01         0.34        0.08        -0.05     -0.27
PROFIT 1.59       1        0.25          0.03    -0.26       -0.20        -0.11     0.12
LIQ 1.10                       1 -0.01     -0.08       -0.10         0.09     0.16
GROWTH 1.28        1       0.37        -0.05       -0.08 0.21
LNSIZE 1.38             1      0.38        -0.27       -0.28
OFORM 1.35          1        -0.30       -0.31
REINS 1.24               1   0.26
BUS 1.25        1
====================================================================
Table 2 The Rating Decision Multinomial Logit Model: Estimation Results
This table shows the estimation results for the rating decision multinomial logit model, using data from our
complete sample, which consists of an average of 92 UK insurance companies over five years (making 460
company/year observations in total). The first part of the table lists the parameter estimates and standard errors for
the A.M. Best-rated and S&P-rated insurance companies, while the second part shows the marginal effects for the
A.M. Best-rated, S&P-rated and non-rated insurers respectively. The final part of the table shows a c2 goodnes -of-
fit statistic and a cross-tabulation of predicted and actual values of the rating decision dummy variable.
=====================================================================
A.M. Best S&P
Variable    Parameter   Estimate   Standard ErrorEstimate   Standard Error
CONSTANT a0     13.65 3.53**     10.12 2.85**
RES a1   -17.01 3.55**      -3.71 2.46
PROFIT a2     35.26 4.81**     10.08 3.40**
LIQ a3           1.12 0.50**     -1.82 0.47**
GROWTH a4      0.03 0.02*         0.03 0.02*
LNSIZE a5      -1.09 0.23**       -1.06 0.20**
OFORM a6        -1.19 1.09   -13.06          17.14
REINS a7        -1.03 1.11         -3.20 0.80**
BUS a8         1.34 0.59**       2.97 0.52**
Marginal Effects a
   A.M. Best S&P         Non-rated
  (j = 3) (j = 1) (j = 0)
RES -1.94  0.39  1.55
PROFIT  3.93 -0.72 -3.21
LIQ  0.18 -0.09 -0.09
GROWTH  0.003  0.00 -0.003
LNSIZE -0.097 -0.003  0.10
OFORM  0.24 -0.40  0.16
REINS             -0.03 -0.07  0.10
BUS  0.07 -0.06 -0.01
c2  =  710.6 (Reject hypothesis that all coefficients are zero)b
           Predicted             Totals
Actual 0 1 2
0       110       23 7 140
1         14             1101 125
2           7    6      182 195
Totals          131             139      190460
**  = significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (one-tailed tests).    *  = significantly different from zero at
the 0.10 level (one-tailed tests). a Computed at the means of the independent variables.   b The critical value of c2
for this test is 14.07.
Table 3 The Rating Decision Probit Models: Estimation Results
This table shows the estimation results for the rating decision probit models. To obtain the A.M. Best estimates,
data were used from a sample of an average of 39 A.M. Best-rated and 28 non-rated UK-based insurance
companies over five years (making 335 company/year observations in total). To obtain the S&P estimates, data
were used from a sample of 25 S&P-rated and the 28 non-rated UK-based insurance companies over five years
(making 265 observations in total). To obtain the overall estimates, data were used from an average of 64 A.M.
Best-rated and S&P-rated UK-based insurance companies, together with the 28 non-rated companies over five
years (making 460 observations in total). The first part of the table lists the parameter estimates and standard
errors, while the second part shows a set of diagnostic statistics and cross-tabulations of predicted and actual values
of the rating decision dummy variables. In the A.M. Best model, GROWTH proved to be highly insignificant
(t<0.5) and so has been omitted. In the S&P sample, all insurers are stock companies, so the coefficient of OFORM
could not be estimated.
=====================================================================
Model 1. A.M. Best  2. S&P 3. Overall
Variable   Parameter   Estimate  Estimate    Estimate
CONSTANT a0 2.95 (1.61)* 6.15 (1.65)** 5.41 (1.22) **
RES a1            -6.80 (1.75)**            -1.77 (1.51)           -3.48 (1.10) **
PROFIT a2           14.66 (2.17)** 5.20 (1.87)** 9.80 (1.36) **
LIQ a3 0.58 (0.21)**            -0.83 (0.26)**            -0.10 (0.16)
GROWTH a4    - - 0.16 (0.06)** 0.02 (0.01) **
LNSIZE a5            -0.20 (0.10)**            -0.84 (0.12)**            -0.52 (0.08) **
OFORM a6            -0.44 (0.47)     - -            -0.44 (0.35)
REINS a7            -0.62 (0.53)           -1.88 (0.47)**            -1.59 (0.37) **
BUS a8 1.14 (0.36)** 1.71 (0.30)** 1.18 (0.20) **
Standard errors in parentheses
Chi-squared test: c2 = 368.7 c2 = 196.4 c2 = 327.5
  (Reject hypothesis that all coefficients are zero)a
Kullback-Leibler R2: R2 = 0.81 R2 = 0.44
Predicted and actual values of the dependent variable:
A.M. Best S&P Overall
Predicted      Totals   Predicted Totals       Predicted  Totals
Actual     0      1   Actual    0    1      Actual      0        1
0            132      8 140   0          119      21140      0        111      29    140
1              10     185195   1          16    109125      1          23    297    320
Totals  142     193335 Totals  135    130 265    Totals      134    326     460
===================================================================
 **  = significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (one-tailed tests).
 *    = significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level (one-tailed tests).
 a  The critical value of c2 or this test is 14.07.
Table 4 The Rating Determination Ordered Probit Models with Sample
Selection: Estimation Results
This table shows the estimation results for the rating determination ordered probit model with sample selection.
Data were derived from a sample of 28 non-rated, an average of 39 A.M. Best-rated and 25 S&P-rated UK-based
insurance companies over five years (making 335 observations in total for the A.M. Best estimation and 265 for the
S&P estimation). The first part of the table provides the parameter estimates and standard errors, while the second
part summarizes a set of diagnostic statistics and the marginal effects for each independent variable. GROWTH
proved to be highly insignificant in both models and so has been omitted from the models. The coefficient of
OFORM cannot be estimated in the S&P model because all of the S&P-rated companies in the sample are stock
companies.
=====================================================================
 A.M. Best   S&P
Variable     Parameter Estimate    Standard Error Estimate    Standard Error
CONSTANT b0       0.40 1.15   10.25 3.93
RES b1     -1.16 1.24  -13.33 3.74**
PROFIT b2       2.55 0.97**     5.05 5.80
LIQ b3       0.18 0.10**     2.18 0.87**
LNSIZE b5       0.11 0.11    -0.17 0.38
OFORM b6        0.70 0.35**        -    -
REINS b7       -0.37 0.57     0.15 1.62
BUS b8        0.03 0.26     0.12 1.28
Division m1       0.79 0.18**     1.71 0.31**
m2       2.74 0.22**     3.15 0.38**
Error corr. r       0.75 0.31**     0.06 1.66
Chow tests: F  =  0.18 F  =  0.32
 (Cannot reject hypothesis of temporal stability in either model)a
Breusch-Pagan tests: c2  =  7.96 c2  = 5.89
(Cannot reject hypothesis of homoskedasticity)b
Marginal Effects:
A.M. Best Rating S&P Rating
0     1    2    3 0   1    2    3
RES 0.14   0.21 -0.12 -0.23 2.86 1.60 -3.80 -0.66
PROFIT            -0.31 -0.46   0.26   0.50              -1.08      -0.60 1.43  0.25
LIQ            -0.02 -0.03   0.02   0.04              -0.47      -0.26 0.62  0.11
LNSIZE                     -0.01 -0.02   0.01   0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.01
OFORMc            -0.08 -0.13   0.07   0.14   -   -    -    -
REINS             0.04   0.07 -0.04 -0.07               -0.03    -0.02 0.04  0.01
BUSc           -0.004 -0.006   0.003  0.006              -0.03    -0.01 0.03  0.01
===================================================================
 **  = significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (one-tailed tests).
a  The critical value of F for this test is 2.08 .   b The critical value of c2 or this test is 14.07.
c Each marginal effect for the dummy variables OFORM and BUS is calculated as the change in probability that
   results when the dummy variable changes by one unit.
